

The ethnic vote as a state of integration

Electoral participation of migrants in the Netherlands

Marianne van Bochove
Erasmus University Rotterdam
Paper for the course
*Inclusion and Exclusion in
Contemporary European Societies*
Dubrovnik, 14-18 April 2008

Contents

1. Introduction	3
2. Immigrant electoral participation: Theories and assumptions	4
3. Ethnic voting and integration: Empirical results	7
4. Conclusion	13
References	14
Annex 1 – Immigrant candidates on the list of the Labour Party in Rotterdam	16
Annex 2 – Party of choice among the Rotterdam middle class	17

1. Introduction

During the one-week course in Dubrovnik attention was paid to the broad theme of inclusion and exclusion. In different presentations and workshops it became clear that processes of inclusion (e.g. the extension of the EU, the integration of migrants) and exclusion (e.g. stereotypical images of the ‘other’, the barring of undocumented immigrants) are taking place at the same time.

In this paper I discuss the electoral participation of migrants as an expression of simultaneous inclusion and exclusion. While migrants in Europe for a long time were considered to be politically passive, by now, their political activities and identities are much discussed in public and political debate. However, although migrants are more visible in the political arena than before, this does not mean that they are automatically perceived as more integrated.

In public discourse on migrant political integration it does not only matter *if* migrants vote, but also *for whom* they vote. This became especially clear after the local elections in Rotterdam in 2006. In the next paragraph, I explain why the occurrence of so-called ‘ethnic voting’ is often seen as an indicator for failing migrant integration.

In the third paragraph, I investigate to what extent ethnic voting can indeed be seen as a sign of failing integration. In doing this, I use the data that I have collected for my PhD-thesis on middle class (Surinamese, Turkish and Moroccan) migrants in Rotterdam, the Netherlands.

In the concluding paragraph I answer the research question, comparing the often made assumptions on the relationship between ethnic voting and migrant integration with the results of empirical research. In this paragraph, I also return to the broader issue of simultaneous inclusion and exclusion¹.

¹ The author wishes to thank Friso van Houdt for his ideas on seeing the results of this research in the broader context of inclusion and exclusion. The author also thanks the other participants of the presentation session on minority voices and languages for their useful comments.

2. Immigrant electoral participation: Theories and assumptions

2.1 Introduction

During the local elections in Rotterdam in 2006, a majority of the migrant votes went to the Labour Party. On the list of this party were many candidates with an immigrant background, who received a substantial share of the votes. Consequently, a discussion was launched on the meaning of this migrant voting behaviour. For different reasons, the occurrence of so-called 'ethnic voting' is seen as an sign of failing migrant integration. In this paragraph, I discuss different scientific and common sense notions on the relationship between migrant electoral participation and integration, paying special attention to ethnic voting. Based on these notions, I will end this paragraph with formulating a research question and two hypotheses.

2.2 Migrant electoral participation in social science

For a long time, immigrants in many EU countries were considered to be apolitical or at least politically passive. Both in academics and in politics not much attention was paid to political mobilisation, activities and identities of immigrants and their offspring (Martiniello 2006: 81). As these migrants were supposed to be temporary guests only, local and national political integration was seen as undesirable. This attitude towards immigrant political participation has changed overtime. Migrants are recognized as here to stay and are now expected to integrate or even assimilate in their host society.

In 1986, for the first time non-naturalized residents could participate in the local elections in the Netherlands. An explicit goal of granting immigrants full political rights on the local level was encouraging their integration into Dutch society. The idea was that voting for the elections requires some orientation on the Dutch political system, the existing political parties and their viewpoints; this orientation in turn was supposed to stimulate migrant integration (Berger et al. 2001).

Despite the attempt to stimulate local electoral participation, turn-out rates among migrants in the Netherlands are generally lower than those among the native Dutch. Although differences exist between migrant groups – Turks for instance are known to be politically well-organized (see Fennema and Tillie 2001, Van Heelsum 2005) – in many cases the turn-out among migrants is more than ten per cent below city average (Berger et al. 2001, Tillie 2006, Van Heelsum 2006).

Besides this concern for the number of migrants that vote during elections, studies within political science and sociology pay attention to the parties and candidates that migrants vote for. In Dutch (local and national) elections, a majority of migrant votes usually go to left-wing parties such as the Labour Party and the Green Party (Berger et al. 2001, Tillie 2006). Next to this preference for a leftist party, many migrants vote for a candidate of their own ethnic origin. According to Martiniello (2006), both these tendencies can be referred to as 'ethnic voting'. He distinguishes between a narrow and a broad definition of the ethnic or immigrant vote:

In a first sense, [ethnic voting] refers to the individual vote cast by a voter who belongs to an ethnic category for one or several candidates of the same ethnic group, or for a party which regroups candidates of this same group. (...) In a second and broader sense, we can also talk of an ethnic vote when a substantial majority of voters of a same ethnic category support a specific candidate or party and their policy whatever the ethnic origin of the candidate or composition of the party. (Martiniello 2006: 93)

Martiniello argues that there is not yet a convincing general theory to explain why migrants tend to vote for certain parties and certain candidates.

Consequently, the ethnic vote should always be treated as a contingent phenomenon in need of explanation rather than as a presupposition that relies on the dubious assumption that ethnic groups tend to cast block votes. (Martiniello 2006: 92)

The aim of this paper is to explain the occurrence of both mentioned types of ethnic voting during the local elections in Rotterdam in 2006. Migrants in Rotterdam massively voted for a single party, i.e. the Labour Party (broad definition of ethnic voting). In addition, many migrants voted for a candidate with a specific ethnic background (narrow definition of ethnic voting). Although in social sciences a general theory to explain ethnic voting does not exist, a persistent explanation in Dutch public debate is that migrants' specific voting behaviour is an expression of their failed integration.

2.3 Migrant electoral participation in public debate

In Dutch media and politics, various (mainly right-wing) opinion makers are concerned about the political integration of migrants. As within social sciences, attention is not only paid to the question *if* migrants vote, but also – and more importantly – to the question *for whom* they vote. In the political debate, Geert Wilders' anti-Islam party Party for Freedom expresses its concern about the consequences of a large immigrant electorate. As a symbolic measure to stop the 'islamization' of Dutch society, the party calls for restricting several migrant rights such as local voting rights of non-naturalized residents (Partij voor de Vrijheid 2006). Below, I focus on comparable statements made by Dutch newspapers and newsmagazines.

After the local elections in 2006, the reactions on the high migrant turn-out in several cities were mixed. While low turn-out rates are often seen as an indicator for disinterest towards Dutch politics and Dutch society (cf. Pos and Wynia 2001), the fact that this time many migrants voted was not by everyone celebrated as a sign of successful integration (Tillie 2006). Particularly in Rotterdam, the ethnic vote had visible impact on the election results. In reaction, the Dutch newspaper *De Volkskrant* wrote about the danger of 'clientelism':

(...) many migrant voters expect something in return for the support they gave to a certain candidate. After all, that is the procedure in their home country. (Meerhof 2006, translation MvB)

As a result of the high turn-out, migrants could not anymore be labelled as politically passive or disinterested in Dutch politics. However, their support for a specific party or a specific candidate brought about the image of migrants as calculating citizens who use Dutch politics for their own (cultural) interests. This view was advanced earlier in the Dutch right-wing newsmagazine *Elsevier*. At the end of 2001, the cover story of *Elsevier* was about the dangers of migrants' loyalty towards their own ethnic group and their country of origin (Pos and Wynia 2001). The following passage gives a good summary of the authors' view on migrant political participation.

Through ongoing immigration, the Netherlands is faced with several transnational communities. The members of these communities, *often unemployed*, focus on each other and on their country of origin. These calculating world citizens are now demanding a prominent place in Dutch politics, *to serve their own clan*. Although *disloyal to the Netherlands*, they expect to get an unemployment benefit and to get respect. (Pos and Wynia 2001, translation and italics MvB)

In this quotation, an explicit connection is made between the political behaviour of migrants (serving their own 'clan') and their failing integration into Dutch society (often unemployed, disloyal to the Netherlands). Can this argumentation explain why many migrants in Rotterdam

voted for the Labour Party and for a candidate of their own ethnic background? In other words, do migrants vote for a leftist party because they need an unemployment benefit, and do they vote for an 'ethnic' candidate because they only focus on their country of origin? These questions will be investigated in the next paragraph, after having formulated the research question and two hypotheses.

2.4 Research question and hypotheses

In this paragraph I have discussed different aspects of migrant electoral participation, using both academic literature and the news coverage in Dutch press. While the mentioned academic studies pay little attention to explaining the electoral behaviour of migrants, in Dutch media clear statements are made on the relationship between the occurrence of ethnic voting and the supposed failing of the integration of migrants in Dutch society. I will investigate this relationship by answering the following research question:

To what extent can ethnic voting be seen as an indicator for failing migrant integration?

In answering this question, I will focus on two aspects of migrant integration: the socioeconomic position of migrants on the one hand and their feelings of belonging to the Netherlands on the other hand. Based on the above-mentioned statements made by Pos and Wynia (2001), I formulate two hypotheses.

1) Migrants have a poor socioeconomic position and therefore vote for a leftist party.

This hypothesis concerns the relationship between socioeconomic integration and Martiniello's broad definition of ethnic voting.

2) Migrants are only loyal to each other and their country of origin and therefore vote 'ethnically'.

This hypothesis concerns the relationship between feelings of belonging and Martiniello's narrow definition of ethnic voting.

In the remaining of this paper, I will answer the research question by testing the two formulated hypotheses. In doing this, I will use the data that I have collected for my PhD-thesis on middle class migrants in Rotterdam.

3. Ethnic voting and integration: Empirical results

3.1 Introduction

Martiniello (2006: 92) argues that it cannot be taken for granted that migrants vote ethnically. However, if they do so, as was the case in the Rotterdam elections in 2006, the question remains how this can be explained. According to the statements in Dutch media, ethnic voting is correlated with the degree to which migrants are integrated into Dutch society. In this paragraph I investigate to what extent this argumentation is correct. The two hypotheses that are formulated above will be tested, after having explained the Rotterdam context and the research method.

3.2 The Rotterdam context

With its population over 584.000 inhabitants, Rotterdam is the second largest city in the Netherlands (COS 2007). Almost half of the population (46 per cent) of Rotterdam has a non-native Dutch background. The largest minority groups are migrants from Surinam (9 per cent), Turkey (8 per cent) and Morocco (6 per cent) (COS 2007, own calculation).

For a long time, immigration and integration did not play a decisive role in the local elections in Rotterdam. From 1946 to 2002, the social-democratic Labour Party has been the largest party in the City Council. However, this hegemony suddenly ended in 2002, when a new party took over power. Pim Fortuyn, the leader of the new party Liveable Rotterdam, openly talked about cultural differences as a cause of societal problems (see Poorthuis and Wansink 2002). With his eye-catching appearance and his understandable message he gained a lot of support, particularly among the lower class Dutch.

However, was not given the chance to make his large ambitions in local and national politics come true, as he was assassinated by a Dutch animal rights activist only two months after his election victory in Rotterdam. In a coalition with the Christian Democratic Party and the centre-right Liberal Party, Liveable Rotterdam attempted to govern the city 'in the spirit of Pim'. As a result, the discourse and the measures regarding integration and criminality became stricter (cf. Engbersen et al. 2005, Uitermark and Duyvendak 2005, Schinkel 2008).

Whereas in 2002 Pim Fortuyn persuaded a large part of the lower class native Dutch into voting in the local elections, in the next elections in 2006 the turn-out was remarkably high among migrants. The total turn-out rate had not changed much (55 per cent in 2002, 58 per cent in 2006), however, among different migrant groups it had increased by more than 10 per cent (among Moroccans even by almost 20 per cent, from 39 per cent in 2002 to 58 per cent in 2006) (Tillie 2006). Although Liveable Rotterdam maintained a large part of its electorate, the Labour Party became the largest party again (Van Rhee et al. 2006).

The Labour Party's victory in Rotterdam was attributed to the ethnic vote: many migrants had voted on this party, supposedly attracted by its leftist character and the large number of 'ethnic' candidates on its list (see Annex 1). Turning to the research question formulated in the previous paragraph: to what extent can this migrant voting behaviour be seen as a sign of failing integration?

3.3 Methodology

The data used for answering the research question are conducted for a larger project, named *Transnationalism and Urban Citizenship*. Between May and November 2007, 225 middle class migrants of Surinamese, Turkish and Moroccan origin in Rotterdam were interviewed (75 for each group). At the beginning of 2008, an additional 100 interviews were conducted with native Dutch members of the middle class in Rotterdam. The respondents differ with respect to age,

gender and ethnic background. They have in common that they are members of (upper) middle class groups in Rotterdam, having intermediate or higher level occupations or working as entrepreneur.

In selecting respondents a variety of strategies was used, such as contacting companies and attending meetings. Also, respondents were selected via the interviewers' own social networks and through the snowball method. This last method implies that respondents were asked if they know any other people (in most cases friends or colleagues) with a Surinamese, Turkish or Moroccan (and in a later stadium: Dutch) background who live Rotterdam and belong to the middle class.

The interviews were conducted using a questionnaire that consists of closed as well as open questions on topics concerning different forms of political activities and processes of identification. For this paper, the following questions on local electoral participation are used: 'Did you vote during the most recent local elections?', 'What party did you vote for?' 'What was the ethnic background of the candidate you voted for?'. With regard to identification, the following questions are used: 'To what extent do you feel attached to the Netherlands?', 'To what extent do you feel attached to your country of origin?'

3.4 Ethnic voting among the migrant middle class

As with native Dutch members of the middle class, the political participation of the migrant middle class is relatively high. Whereas the total turn-out rate for the Rotterdam local elections in 2006 was 58 per cent, among our respondents this percentage is 83 for the native Dutch middle class and 80 for the migrant middle class. However, as becomes clear in testing the first hypothesis, striking differences exist between the native and the non-native Dutch middle class with regard to party choice.

3.4.1 Hypothesis 1: Left-wing voting and socioeconomic integration

Following the argumentation of Pos and Wynia (2001), we could explain the victory of the Labour Party in Rotterdam by pointing at the low socioeconomic position of migrants. In their view, migrants vote for a leftist party because these parties secure unemployment benefits. However, the migrants in our research are considered to be socioeconomically 'well-integrated'. Regarding the level of education and occupation, the non-native Dutch respondents are comparable to the native Dutch respondents.

Among the native Dutch middle class a considerable percentage generally votes for the centre-right Liberal Party, which is supportive for a free market and low taxes. If party choice would depend on economic interests only, we could expect the migrant middle class not only to vote for parties that speak out for the underprivileged. However, socioeconomic issues are not necessarily decisive for party choice (cf. Achterberg 2006).

Table 1 shows the party choice of the respondents who voted during the Rotterdam elections of 2006 (see also Annex 2 for a graphic illustration). Parties on the left side of the political spectrum are typed in red, right-wing parties in blue, Christian parties in green and other parties in purple.

Table 1

Party choice of middle class citizens in Rotterdam during the 2006 local elections, in percentages

	Native Dutch middle class	Non-native Dutch middle class
Labour Party (PvdA)	19	58
Green Party (GroenLinks)	17	17
Socialist Party (SP)	10	15
Liberal Party (VVD)	20	1
Liveable Rotterdam (Leefbaar Rotterdam)	4	1
Christian Democratic Party (CDA)	12	2
Christian Union (ChristenUnie)	10	0
Democrats (D66)	5	2
Other	2	1
Don't remember	1	1
No answer	0	2

First of all, it is striking to see that Liveable Rotterdam, which came out of the elections as the largest party after the Labour Party, is not popular among our middle class respondents. This party receives a small percentage of votes within both subpopulations. Next to this similarity, however, there are some major differences between the native Dutch and the migrant respondents.

We can see that whereas the native Dutch middle class in Rotterdam is divided over many different parties, the migrant middle class is highly concentrated within the Labour Party: 58 per cent of the migrants who voted gave their support to this party². Among the native Dutch middle class this is only 19 per cent. Looking at the percentage of respondents who vote for a leftist party, we see that this is 90 per cent for the migrants and 46 for the native Dutch. The Liberal Party, which received 20 per cent of the native Dutch votes, proves to be no option for the migrant middle class.

Accordingly, we can say that socioeconomic differences between native Dutch voters and migrant voters cannot explain differences in their voting behaviour. Even though many of the middle class migrants have a relatively high income, 90 per cent of them voted for a leftist party. With this, the first hypothesis is rejected: the migrants in our research do not cast an ethnic vote (in Martiniello's broad sense) because of their poor socioeconomic integration and their need for unemployment benefits.

Let us now turn to hypothesis two, concerning Martiniello's narrow definition of ethnic voting. Maybe migrants vote for a leftist party because of their preference for a candidate of their own ethnic origin.

3.4.2 Hypothesis 2: Ethnic voting and loyalty to the Netherlands

According to Pos and Wynia (2001), the fact that many migrants vote for a candidate of their own ethnic background is a sign of migrant disintegration into Dutch society. In their opinion, migrants support a certain 'ethnic' candidate and expect direct advantages in return (cf. Meerhof 2006). Although the collected data do not provide an answer to the question if this fear of 'clientelism' is realistic, other aspects of the argumentation of Pos and Wynia (2001) can be tested. The authors argue that ethnic voting can be seen as a sign for migrants' disloyalty to the Netherlands. According to them, migrants are only physically present in the Netherlands, their thoughts and feelings still being in their country of origin.

² No meaningful differences were found between the different migrant groups.

To test the second hypothesis (i.e. migrants vote ‘ethnically’ because they are only loyal to their country of origin), it is important firstly to investigate how many migrants indeed voted for a candidate of their own ethnic origin. Table 2 shows the candidate choice of respondents who voted during the Rotterdam elections.

Table 2

Ethnic background of the candidates middle class citizens in Rotterdam voted for, in percentages

Ethnic background voter	Votes for native Dutch candidate	Votes for candidate of own ethnicity	Votes for candidate of other ethnicity
Native Dutch	68	(=68)	12
Surinamese	49	26	13
Turkish	34	60	0
Moroccan	51	31	11

Note. The percentages do not sum to 100 per cent, because some respondents could not remember whom they had voted for.

While almost all non-native Dutch respondents voted for a leftist party, we can see that ethnic voting in more narrow sense is less common. A substantial percentage of Moroccan, Surinamese and, to a lesser extent, Turkish respondents voted for a native Dutch candidate. Among Turks, who are known to be politically well-organised, ethnic voting occurs more often (cf. Tillie 2006).

Compared to Tillie’s (2006: 22) national figures, the percentage of Turks and Surinamese in our research that vote ‘ethnically’ is slightly higher, while the percentage of Moroccans is lower. The next question is whether the occurrence of ethnic voting and the differences between ethnic groups can be explained by the degree to which these migrants are loyal to their country of origin and to the Netherlands. To answer this question, data on feelings of attachment are used. We asked our respondents to what extent they feel attached to the Netherlands (Table 3) and to their home country (Table 4).

Table 3

Degree of attachment to the Netherlands, in percentages

	Not (that) closely attached	(Very) closely attached
Native Dutch	24	76
Surinamese	19	81
Turks	13	87
Moroccans	12	88

Table 4

Degree of attachment to country of origin, in percentages

	Not (that) closely attached	(Very) closely attached
Surinamese	28	72
Turks	21	79
Moroccans	39	61

Table 3 shows that more than 80 per cent of the different migrant groups feels closely or very closely attached to the Netherlands. Remarkably, for all three groups this percentage is higher than that among the native Dutch respondents. As Table 4 shows, the respondents also feel attached to their country of origin, although to a somewhat lesser extent. Whereas Pos and Wynia (2001) presume that migrants only focus on their country of origin and disloyal to the Netherlands, these figures show that feelings of belonging to one country do not necessarily impede feelings of belonging to another country. However, with this we do not yet know if there is a relationship between feelings of attachment and ethnic voting. This is investigated in Table 5.

Table 5

Ethnic voting among middle class migrants and degree of attachment to the Netherlands, in percentages

	Voted for a Dutch candidate	Voted for a non-Dutch candidate
Not (that) closely attached	50	50
(Very) closely attached	49	51

In Table 5, the Surinamese, Turkish and Moroccan respondents are divided into two groups: one group feels (very) closely attached to the Netherlands, the other group does not³. Following the argumentation of Pos and Wynia (2001), we would expect migrants that feel not (that) closely attached to the Netherlands to vote for a non-Dutch candidate more often than candidates that feel (very) closely attached to the Netherlands. However, this expectation is not confirmed by the data. With these results, the second hypothesis can be rejected.

Ethnic voting in a narrow sense (voting for a non-native Dutch candidate) is not a sign for migrant disloyalty to the Netherlands, just as ethnic voting in a more broad sense (a preference for leftist parties) proved to be not an indicator for failed socioeconomic integration. A logical question arises from these results. If failing migrant integration cannot explain why many migrants in Rotterdam voted ethnically during the 2006 local elections, what can? Returning to the specific political context in Rotterdam, this question will be addressed below.

3.5 An alternative explanation for the ethnic vote in Rotterdam

As explained at the beginning of this paragraph, the political climate in Rotterdam has gone through some major changes since the start of the new millennium. Whereas for half a century

³ Again, no large differences were found between the different migrant groups.

the leftist Labour Party was the largest party in the City Council, suddenly in 2002 a new right-wing party took over power. This election victory of Pim Fortuyn's party Liveable Rotterdam in 2002 and the persistent support for the party in 2006 can be interpreted as a sign of dissatisfaction among native Dutch citizens in Rotterdam. These feelings of dissatisfaction and resentment are mainly directed to Rotterdam citizens with an immigrant background, who by many are seen as poorly integrated or as 'undeserving poor' (cf. Engbersen 2006, Wilson 1996). Although these sentiments were already present before 2002 (cf. Engbersen 1990), since that time they have come to the surface more and are being publicly expressed by politicians.

Whereas a large part of the native Dutch citizens in Rotterdam in 2002 showed their dissatisfaction by voting for Liveable Rotterdam, in 2006 a large part of the migrant citizens showed their grievance by voting for the Labour Party. Due to the restrictive policy of the right-wing coalition in the years before, and – perhaps even more importantly – the rhetoric used in politics as well as in public debate, many migrants felt the need to speak up. A vote for the Labour Party was a strategic vote: this traditionally large party with its migrant-friendly image could counterbalance the power of Liveable Rotterdam.

The Labour Party (as well as the Green Party) had put many migrant candidates on their list to attract the 'ethnic vote' (cf. Meerhof 2006). However, as Tillie (2006) argues, the presence of certain 'ethnic candidates' was not the main reason for migrants to vote for these parties. According to him, party choice based on strategic or ideological considerations precedes the choice for a certain candidate. This is supported by the results of our research on the migrant middle class in Rotterdam: the percentages of migrants voting for a left-wing party were higher than the percentages of migrants voting for an 'ethnic candidate'.

Many migrants in our research strategically voted for the Labour Party. Although these middle class respondents have a good job and feel that the Netherlands is their home – and thus can be considered 'well-integrated' – they do not always feel welcome here, as these concluding quotations make clear.

I used to be proud of the Netherlands, but nowadays I am not. Society has changed. The Netherlands used to be a progressive and 'open' country, but now that's diminished. (Turkish female, 30, employment officer)

The last few years, I feel less at home in the Netherlands. Nevertheless I feel attached to this country. If I go on holiday, after a few weeks I am getting homesick. But I do not always feel welcome here. People think in terms of 'we' and 'them', and politicians encourage that. (Moroccan female, 27, social worker)

I want to feel like a real Dutchman, but because others don't see me that way, I can't. (Surinamese male, 55 years old, business controller at a bank)

I would like to feel like 'Rotterdammer' or Dutchman, but because of the way other people approach me, I feel Moroccan (Moroccan male, 32, policy officer)

4. Conclusion

In this paper I have shown that ethnic voting in Martiniello's (2006) broad and narrow definition cannot be put aside as a sign of failed migrant integration. Based on statements made in Dutch media, I formulated two hypotheses on the supposed relationship between integration and the occurrence of ethnic voting during the 2006 local elections in Rotterdam.

Using data on middle class migrants of Surinamese, Turkish and Moroccan origin, the hypotheses were tested. The first hypothesis (*migrants have a poor socioeconomic position and therefore vote for a leftist party*) was rejected: the middle class migrants in our research are socioeconomically successful but still massively voted for a leftist party. The second hypothesis (*migrants are only loyal to each other and their country of origin and therefore vote 'ethnically'*) also was rejected. Although many of the migrants in our research voted for a candidate of their own ethnic origin, they feel attached to the Netherlands.

The reason why our respondents and many other migrants in Rotterdam en masse voted for the Labour Party was not because of a certain ethnic candidate, but because they wanted to change Liveable Rotterdam's restrictive policy and make a statement against anti-immigrant sentiments. Although important differences exist between Rotterdam and other Dutch cities, a clash between native Dutch and immigrant inhabitants is not restricted to Rotterdam. As in other European countries, in the Netherlands, immigration and integration have become major issues in the political debate. At this moment, politicians such as Rita Verdonk and Geert Wilders gain a lot of support with their talking of the supposed 'islamization' of Dutch society.

Many migrants feel the consequences of the right-wing political climate. Although many of them are born in the Netherlands, they do not always feel welcome here. This even proved to be true for the middle class migrants in our research, that in many ways can be considered as well-integrated. These migrants have a good socioeconomic position: they are well-educated and successful on the labour market. However, in the current political and public discourse, being socioeconomically integrated is not enough. The standards that migrants have to meet are becoming increasingly higher (cf. Entzinger and Dourleijn 2008). Not only are migrants expected to participate in different spheres of society (i.e. on the labour market, in politics, in voluntary organizations, cf. Van Houdt 2008), they are more and more demanded to give up certain aspects of their identity, such as religious beliefs and homeland ties.

Thus, while migrants in the Netherlands can be considered included or integrated in different ways, simultaneously they are being excluded because of their 'otherness'. This ascribed collective identity can urge them into a strategic vote, as we have seen in Rotterdam. Although this strategic vote had the desired short-term result, anti-immigrant sentiments will not diminish with merely a change of government.

References

- Achterberg, P. (2006) *Considering Cultural Conflict: Class Politics and Cultural Politics in Western Societies*, Maastricht: Shaker Publishing.
- Berger, M., M. Fennema, A. van Heelsum, J. Tillie, R. Wolff (2001) *Politieke participatie van etnische minderheden in vier steden* [Political participation of ethnic minorities in four cities], Amsterdam: IMES Rapportenreeks.
- Centrum voor Onderzoek en Statistiek (COS) (2007) *RotterdamDATA. Inwoners 2002-2007*, visited on 12 May 2008, on <http://213.160.249.87/reportportal/design/view.aspx>
- Engbersen, G. (1990) *Publieke Bijstandsgeheimen. Het ontstaan van een onderklasse in Nederland* [Welfare's public secrets. The birth of an underclass in the Netherlands]. Leiden/Antwerpen: H.E. Stenfert Kroese.
- Engbersen, G. (2006) *Publieke Bijstandsgeheimen. Het ontstaan van een onderklasse in Nederland* [Welfare's public secrets. The birth of an underclass in the Netherlands]. Amsterdam: Amsterdam Academic Archive (second edition).
- Engbersen, G., E. Snel and A. Weltevrede (2005) *Sociale herovering in Amsterdam en Rotterdam. Eén verhaal over twee wijken* [Social recapture in Amsterdam and Rotterdam. One story on two neighbourhoods]. Den Haag/Amsterdam: WRR/ Amsterdam University Press.
- Entzinger, H. and E. Dourleijn (2008) *De lat steeds hoger: De leefwereld van jongeren in een multi-etnische stad* [Setting higher standards: The living environment of youth in a multi-ethnic city], Assen: Van Gorcum.
- Fennema, M. and J. Tillie (2001) "Civic Community, Political Participation and Political Trust of Ethnic Groups", *Connections*, Vol. 24, No.4, pp. 26-41.
- Martiniello, M. (2006) "Political participation, mobilisation and representation of immigrants and their offspring in Europe", in R. Bauböck (ed.) *Migration and citizenship: Legal status, rights and political participation*, Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press.
- Meerhof, R. (2006) "Rotterdam: zwart zit links, wit rechts" [Rotterdam: black is seated left, white right], *De Volkskrant*, 10 March.
- Partij voor de Vrijheid (2006) *Verkiezingspamflet* [Election pamphlet], visited on 28 April 2008 on http://www.pvv.nl/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=788&Itemid=139
- Poorthuis, F. and H. Wansink (2002) 'De islam is een achterlijke cultuur' ['Islam is a backward culture'], in *Het fenomeen Fortuyn*, Amsterdam: de Volkskrant/Meulenhoff
- Pos, G.J. and S. Wynia (2001) "Het gevaar van dubbele loyaliteit" [The danger of dual loyalty], *Elsevier*, 15 December.
- Schinkel, W. (2008) The virtualization of citizenship (forthcoming).
- Tillie, J. (2006) "De strategieën van de allochtone kiezer" [Strategies of the allochthonous voter], *Socialisme en Democratie*, Vol. 63, No. 12, pp. 20-27.
- Uitermark, J. and J.W. Duyvendak (2005) *Civilizing the city. Revanchist urbanism in Rotterdam (the Netherlands)*. Amsterdam: Amsterdam School for Social science Research
- Van Heelsum, A. (2005) "Political Participation and Civic Community of Ethnic Minorities in Four Cities in the Netherlands", *Politics*, Vol. 25, No. 1, pp. 19-30
- Van Heelsum, A. (2006) *Turn out and party choice in the local elections in the Netherlands*, paper for the Metropolis Conference, 2-6 October, Lisbon.
- Van Houdt, F. (2008) *Citizenship as instrument of bio-power. Identifying changes in the functioning of citizenship in the Netherlands in times of globalization and culturistic discourse*. Paper for the course 'Inclusion and Exclusion in Contemporary European Societies', 14-18 April, Dubrovnik.
- Van Rhee, M., C. de Vries, H. van Lith, P. Burger and G. Koster (2006) *Analyse*


gemeenteraadsverkiezingen 2006 [Analysis of the 2006 local elections], Rotterdam: Centrum voor Onderzoek en Statistiek.

Annex 1 – Immigrant candidates on the list of the Labour Party in Rotterdam

1 van Heemst, E.P. (Peter) (m)	48937
2 Wijntuin, P.M. (Peggy) (f)	10138
3 Kriens, J. (Jantiene) (f)	2463
4 Cremers, H.P.L. (Bert) (m)	1121
5 Bruijn, L.C. (Leo) (m)	979
6 Gülmüs, B. (Birsal) (f)	3994
7 Moti, R. (Richard) (m)	3639
8 van Muijen, M.G.J. (Matthijs) (m)	777
9 Talbi, F. (Fatima) (f)	3941
10 Hoogland, D. (Duco) (m)	408
11 Çelik, M. (Metin) (m)	4115
12 Heijmen, M. (Marco) (m)	286
13 de Jong, J. (Jacqueline) (f)	1092
14 Verbrugge, C.G.J. (Claus) (m)	164
15 Harreman, T. (Tom) (m)	805
16 Franken, C.L. (Kees) (m)	222
17 Birinci-Doganer, M. (Müzeyyen) (f)	1311
18 Baran, Z. (Zeki) (m)	2863
19 Talbi, M. (Mohamed) (m)	1949
20 El Haji, F. (Fouad) (m)	1773
21 de Boer, L.A. (Lucas) (m)	251
22 El Bouchtaoui, K. (Karima) (f)	670
23 Steeman, J.W. (Joris) (m)	113
24 Motta, R.A. (Ronald) (m)	449
25 Kuzu, T. (Tunahán) (m)	874
26 Ort, S. (Sabriye) (f)	396
27 Pavion, D.L. (Leonard) (m)	70
28 Gonçalves, J.C. (Carlos) (m)	2693
29 Axwijk, M.O.I. (Myrza) (f)	468
30 Schrijer, D.J. (Dominic) (m)	507

Annex 2 – Party of choice among the Rotterdam middle class

Native Dutch middle class



Surinamese, Turkish and Moroccan middle class

